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Abstract This paper analyzes the evolution of the incidence and intensity of non-
tariff measures (NTMs). It extends earlier work by measuring protection from NTMs 
over time from a newly available database and provides evidence on the evolution of 
NTMs. In particular, building on Kee et al. (Econ J 119(534):172–199, 2009), this 
paper estimates the ad valorem equivalents of NTMs for 97 countries at the product 
level over the period 1997–2015. We show that the incidence and the intensity of 
NTMs were both increasing over this period, with NTMs becoming an even more 
dominant source of trade protection. We are also able to investigate the evolution of 
overall protection derived jointly from tariffs and NTMs. The results show that the 
overall protection level, for most countries and products, has not decreased despite 
the fall in tariffs associated with multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agree-
ments in recent decades. We also document an increase in overall trade protection 
during the recent 2008 financial crisis. Overall, this study sheds light on an under-
researched aspect of trade liberalization: the proliferation and increase of NTMs.
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1 Introduction
Trade reforms associated with multilateral, regional, bilateral and unilateral agree-
ments in recent decades are seen as having reduced trade protection. This is sup-
ported with evidence of the general reduction in tariff rates. For instance, accord-
ing to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Trade 
Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database, the average tariff rates of 
agricultural products worldwide have decreased from 17.9% in 1997 to 10.51% in 
2015 while the average tariff rates for non-agricultural products have decreased from 
8.78% in 1997 to 5.36% in 2015.
Yet, tariffs are just one facet of trade protection, with non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
being non-negligible protectionist trade policy measures. NTMs are defined as pol-
icy measures other than ordinary customs tariffs, that can have an economic effect 
on international trade in goods, change in quantities traded, or prices or both (UNC-
TAD 2010).
It is important to study and measure NTMs.1 First, with the significant reduction 
in tariffs, including bound tariffs in recent decades, NTMs are an important alterna-
tive trade policy measure (see WTO 2012). Indeed, a growing number of countries 
have adopted NTMs as trade protection measures. As reported by the TRAINS data-
base, in 1997, 1456 product lines were subject to at least one type of NTM for each 
country, while this number had increased to 2852 product lines by 2015. Secondly 
and in light of the growing significance of NTMs, we can revisit important ques-
tions such as the impact of trade protectionism on socio-economic outcomes such 
as trade, growth, poverty and firm productivity (Kee et al. 2009). While tariffs are 
impediments to trade, some NTMs have ambiguous effects on trade. For instance, 
quotas and voluntary export restraints as NTMs are unambiguously seen as barri-
ers to trade, but sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) or technical barriers to 
trade (TBT), have a less clear cut effect (Ganslandt and Markusen 2001; Aisbett and 
Pearson 2013). This is due to the fact that though SPS and TBT measures add costs 
to producers, they may also stimulate consumption because of the higher quality of 
imports.2
Despite the relevance and interest in NTMs, measuring their overall extent or 
protectiveness has received limited attention in the trade literature. This is not sur-
prising given the challenges to identification and measurement. Indeed, most pre-
vious attempts to capture NTMs have taken the form of simple indicators that are 
not adequately grounded in trade theory or aggregate measures that fail to capture 
actual trade protection policies (Bowen et al. 2016, p. 52).3 One study that attempts 
1 Interest in studying and measuring trade barriers goes back to the work of Balassa (1965) and Corden 
(1966), though with a focus on tariffs. See Baldwin (1991), Bora et  al. (2002), Deardorff and Stern 
(1998) and Ferrantino (2006) on the quantification of NTMs.
2 This is the reason we prefer the term non-tariff measure (NTM) to non-tariff barrier (NTB), as non-
tariff policies doesn’t just act as an impediment of trade and have only negative welfare effects. Net trade 
effect can be positive.
3 The most common approach used to gauge the restrictiveness of NTMs are the frequency index and 
coverage ratio (Bowen et  al. 2016); though they lack a sound theoretical grounding (Kee et  al. 2009). 
Other measures have taken the form of: applied general equilibrium measures, price-based measures, 
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to define and measure NTMs, including overall trade restrictiveness indicators, is 
Kee et al. (2009). This study adopts quantity-based measures and ground their work 
in trade theory (Leamer 1988, 1990; Trefler 1993; Lee and Swagel 1997). They 
estimate ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs for each country at the tariff line 
level. The approach is to use a common metric for alternative trade policy instru-
ments, allowing direct comparison with tariffs and measurement of the combined or 
overall level of trade protection.4 They estimate AVEs of NTMs at the product level 
and on average for 78 developing and developed countries. However, this estimation 
is carried for only 1 year, 2002 or closest year before 2002 for which data was avail-
able. The key finding of the study is that NTMs account for a large portion of trade 
barriers and restrictiveness across most countries.
This present paper is in that tradition of the empirical work that takes direct 
measures of the incidence of NTMs and infers price (or trade) effects resulting from 
the presence or not of NTMs. There is an alternative strand of the literature which 
uses an indirect approach, inferring the existence of NTMs from unexpected price 
or trade gaps or anomalies (e.g. Bradford 2003; Ferrantino 2006). Given the avail-
ability of improved information across countries and over time on the incidence of 
NTMs, we prefer a direct approach. This direct approach might be applied to either 
bilateral or multilateral trade flows. Both Bouet et  al. (2008) and Bratt (2017) for 
instance use a bilateral approach (for a single point in time), allowing the impact 
on trade of NTMs to vary across exporter-importer country pairings. An appropri-
ate gravity modelling framework allows such analysis to deal with the multilateral 
resistance (the influence of all other countries) on each bilateral trade flow. Given 
that we wish to measure protection over time, we deliberately reduce the non-trivial 
data challenges of also measuring AVEs on a bilateral basis and use data on tariffs, 
NTM incidence and import elasticities measured on a multilateral basis. In doing 
so, the need to model multilateral resistance effects is side-stepped and the presenta-
tional challenge of summarizing bilateral AVEs of NTMs across trade partners and 
time is also reduced. The multilateral approach also allows direct comparison with 
the earlier work of Kee et al. (2009).
A limitation of Kee et al. (2009) is that the paper provides trade protection esti-
mates for a single year, 2002. The analysis cannot comment on the evolution of 
protection from NTMs and the overall protection over time. For instance, with the 
gradual tariff reduction, what happened to NTM protection levels up to and since 
2002? How has overall trade protection levels changed over time and how has 
NTMs changed relative to tariffs? How have these changes varied across countries 
and country groupings, and across products and product groupings?
4 This follows the conceptual work of Anderson and Neary (1994, 1996) where trade distortions are cap-
tured in various ways.
and gravity-based measures (see Bradford 2003; Dean et al. 2009; Disdier and Marette 2010). Even these 
measures have issues, including their lack of tight links to trade theory and precise definition of NTMs 
and trade restrictiveness.
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In the present work we offer insight on such questions, with improved data on the 
classification of NTMs and comparing countries for specific years and over time. 
We are able to comment on the impact of some recent changes and events, such as 
the 2008 financial crisis. This is salient, as in subsequent work, Kee et  al. (2013) 
estimate the change in trade restrictiveness between 2008 and 2009 using indices 
based on the most-favored nation (MFN) tariff rate and antidumping measures, for a 
wide range of countries. They conclude that increased protection from this restricted 
set of trade policy instruments accounted for a very small proportion of the decline 
in trade in the immediate post-financial crisis period. One may legitimately be con-
cerned about whether this conclusion is fashioned by the limited coverage of NTMs 
and by the limited time period.
The goal of this paper is to study the evolution of trade protection levels over 
time, in particular that due to NTMs. Two questions are addressed: Has the level of 
NTM barriers followed the same downward trend as tariff barriers during recent 
decades, or have NTM barriers actually increased? Additionally, how has the over-
all level of trade protection (i.e. from tariffs and NTMs) changed over time?
Our ability to estimate NTM protection levels over time in a consistent manner 
stems from the use of a newly available database on NTMs. This dataset is based 
on a new system of classification of NTMs, namely UNCTAD’s Multi-Agency Sup-
port Team (MAST). Previous studies on NTMs, including Kee et al. (2009), adopted 
UNCTAD’s previous system of classifying NTMs, dubbed the Trade Control Meas-
ures (TCMCS). Using the UNCTAD-MAST, as opposed to the UNCTAD-TCMCS, 
makes it possible to comprehensively analyze NTMs for different countries over 
time. This new data provides improved coverage of measures and captures NTMs in 
greater depth and breadth.
This paper estimates the AVEs of NTMs at the Harmonized System (hereafter 
HS) 6-digit product level for 97 countries over the period 1997–2015, following the 
methodology of Kee et  al. (2009). To be precise we estimate protection levels at 
3 year intervals from 1997 to 2015 (i.e., 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 
2015), making it possible to track and compare the evolution of AVEs of NTMs 
and tariff levels. Such information is of interest to both scholars and policy makers, 
including international agencies such as the WTO, World Bank and IMF. In par-
ticular aid allocation by the latter two agencies is often conditional on trade reforms 
where such indicators of trade protection take a key role.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the methodology for esti-
mating AVEs of NTMs, while Sect. 3 provides information on the data sources and 
descriptive information on the incidence and coverage of NTMs. Section 4 outlines 
the evidence on the estimates of NTM protection levels across different dimensions 
and the evolution of overall trade protection. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 5.
2  Estimation strategy
This paper adopts the methodology of Kee et  al. (2009) and applies it at discrete 
points over time. It estimates country-product regressions for each year that informa-
tion on incidence of core NTMs is available. Then, combining the AVEs of NTMs 
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and tariff equivalents, we obtain total protection levels. This allows us to study all 
three measures over time.
The base model is:
where m
nc
 is the import volume for product n by country c.5 The world price is 
assumed exogenous at unit price for all goods. Therefore, m
nc
 is the normalized 
import quantity. 훼
n
 is the product line intercept, which captures factors related to 
product n that do not change across countries. Core
nc
 is a dummy for core NTM for 
product n in country c. DS
nc
 represents the agricultural domestic support, in millions 
of dollars, reported by WTO for member countries for each product.
t
nc
 represents the ad-valorem tariff on product n in country c and 휀
nc
 is the import 
demand elasticity for product n in country c which is assumed to be unchanged 
over time. This constrained import demand function incorporates the tariff effect on 
import quantity on the left hand side of the equation to deal with the endogeneity of 
tariffs. Furthermore, it models the NTM effect as an additional quantity restriction 
caused by the presence of the non-tariff barrier.6 Given this constrained specifica-
tion may lead to possible misspecification errors in the regression equation, the error 
term 휅
nc
 is in fact an adjusted error term from the unconstrained regression (i.e., 
with tariff as explanatory variable). We use the standard White correction for hetero-
scedasticity as this error term is likely to be heteroscedastic.
훽Core
nc
 and 훽DS
nc
 are coefficients capturing quantity effects for the presence of core 
NTMs and domestic support that vary by country and product. Ck
c
 controls for the 
kth country’s characteristics. In the regressions, the country-characteristics include 
GDP, labor/GDP, capital/GDP, and land/GDP as well as two gravity variables, a 
dummy for islands and the weighted distance to the world market. 훼
nk
 are the coef-
ficients for these country-specific characteristics.
For the above base model (1) we impose some structure on 훽Core
nc
 and 훽DS
nc
 to allow 
for product and country variations by decomposing them into country specific fac-
tors and tariff line specific factors (i.e., the coefficients for core NTM and domes-
tic support have country c and tariff-line n dimensions). This decomposition allows 
the estimation to take full advantage of the data variation without running out of 
degrees of freedom. This yields the following specification:
(1)
lnm
nc
− 휀
nc
ln
(
1 + t
nc
)
= 훼
n
+
∑
훼
nk
C
k
c
+ 훽Core
nc
Core
nc
+ 훽DS
nc
lnDS
nc
+ 휅
nc
5 The zero trade issue arises here. In the case when the country does not report imports for a specific 
product, the import volume should be defined as zero. However, lnm
nc
 would not be defined when 
m
nc
= 0 . We follow Kee et al. (2009) and add 1 to all m
nc
 values recorded as having a zero import value.
6 Where the NTM is the binding constraint it will strictly account for all of the quantity effect, but we 
assume that in the absence of the NTM the tariff barrier would remain.
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The tariff line specific factors come from the 훽Core
n
 and 훽DS
n
 terms, while the country 
specific factors come from the 훽Core
nk
Ck
c
 and 훽DS
nk
Ck
c
 terms. The latter are simply interac-
tion country-specific variables, Ck
c
 , which can be seen to measure the kth country factor 
endowment. Thus, 훽Core
nk
 measures how the kth country specific endowment affects the 
adjusted import volume for product n in country c when a core NTM is present. Simi-
larly, 훽DS
nk
 measures how the kth country specific endowment affects the adjusted import 
volume for product n in country c when ln
(
DS
nc
)
 increases by 1%.
To tackle the endogeneity problem arising from the incidence of NTMs being influ-
enced by import volume at the product level, exports and the change of import vol-
ume over the last period at the product level are included as instrumental variables 
for import volume, following Kee et al. (2009). This is based on the assumption that 
exports and imports from the last period are not affected by future import policy meas-
ures (tariff and NTMs) but they are correlated with the import of the product in the pre-
sent period. These instrumental variables are available at a disaggregated product level 
and have been used in the literature (see Kee et al. 2009).
As an alternative to lagged trade volumes, the GDP-weighted average of the core 
NTM dummies at product level for the five geographically closest countries is also used 
as an alternative instrument for the core NTM incidence dummy. Similarly, the domes-
tic support for product n in country c is also instrumented with the GDP-weighted aver-
age of domestic support for product n of the five geographically closest countries. This 
is based on the notion that geographically close countries may share cultural and legal 
similarities and thus NTM policies may be similar. A country’s NTMs may be influ-
enced by NTMs in neighboring economies, but not its imports. This is a safe assump-
tion as long as an individual country’s NTMs don’t affect world prices and in turn 
imports.
To model core NTMs as an endogenous dummy variable, we use the Heckman-
Maddala treatment effect regression model. We run a Probit regression model for each 
product line where the incidence of a core NTM is instrumented using GDP-weighted 
NTMs for five closest neighbors, exports and lagged change in imports. The inverse 
Mills ratio obtained through this estimation is then included in our estimation of speci-
fication (2), as a control variable. With domestic support being a continuous variable, 
its instrumentation follows a least squares estimation with the above instruments also 
used.
Exponential functions to express the coefficients for 훽Core
nc
 and 훽DS
nc
 are applied and 
regressions are based on nonlinear least square methods. Therefore, the coefficients 
for core NTMs and domestic support are constrained to be non-positive, requiring that 
the imposition of core NTMs and domestic support restricts imports. This is because 
(2)
lnm
nc
− 휀
nc
ln
(
1 + t
nc
)
= 훼
n
+
∑
k
훼
nkt
C
k
C
+
(
훽Core
n
+
∑
k
훽Core
nk
C
k
c
)
Core
nc
+
(
훽DS
n
+
∑
k
훽DS
nk
C
k
c
)
lnDS
nc
+ 휅
nc
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NTMs are assumed to be restrictive in nature and thus expected to exert a negative 
trade effect. The other merit of this is to smooth the observations and moderate the 
effect of any extreme values. Later as a robustness check we relax this assumption.
Our final regression model, after substituting for these exponentials of 훽 , takes a 
non-linear form:
Therefore, non-linear squares is required to estimate the above regression and 
훽Core
nc
.
To allow a comparison with tariffs, NTMs need to be converted and quantified 
into ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs using the estimated coefficients for 
훽Core
nc
 as follows:
The AVEs of NTMs and domestic support are estimated for 5009 product lines 
for 97 countries at 3 year intervals over the period 1997–2015, specifically for 1997, 
2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015. We adopt this 3-year span because we aver-
age the continuous variables like trade flows and domestic support to smooth out 
year-specific shocks. 5009 regressions are run for each of these years to estimate 
import functions at the product or tariff level on a consistent basis.
Finally, overall trade protection, T
nc
 , is made up of AVE of NTMs which country 
c imposes on product n, ave
nc
 , and applied tariff by economy c on imports of prod-
uct n, t
nc
 . Thus, this overall protection on trade imposed by country c on imports of 
product n is depicted as:
Despite the availability of a time dimension in our data we eschew formal 
dynamic modelling. Our goal is to investigate changes in protection between discrete 
points in time. We seek to circumvent the need for dynamic modelling that would 
be required if using continuous, annual data.7 The use of repeated, static modelling 
also allows for direct comparison with the earlier work of Kee et  al. (2009). This 
notwithstanding some robustness checks are reported later in the paper, when we 
replace the contemporaneous trade policy variables with their lagged values.
(3)
lnm
nc
− 휀
nc
ln
�
1 + t
nc
�
= 훼
n
+
�
k
훼
nk
C
k
C
+ (−e
�
훽Core
n
+
∑
k
훽Core
nk
Ck
c
�
)Core
nc
+
�
−e
�
훽DS
n
+
∑
k
훽DS
nk
Ck
c
��
lnDS
nc
+ 휅
nc
(4)aveCorenc =
1
휀
n,c
휕 lnm
nc
휕Core
nc
=
e
βCore
nc − 1
휀
nc
T
nc
= ave
nc
+ t
nc
.
7 Formal dynamic modelling of protection effects on trade over time is a direction for possible further 
work in this area.
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3  Data and descriptives
3.1  Data sources
The trade flow data comes from the COMTRADE database spanning 1995–2015 at 
HS 6-digit level. The import volume data is used to build the left-hand side variable, 
while the export volume data is used as one of the instrumental variables. To elimi-
nate year-specific shocks, trade flow data is averaged for continuous 3  year peri-
ods. The other merit of such smoothing procedure is the tendency for trade flows 
to trend. Trade volume is measured in 1000 dollars (units of dollar are unified into 
dollar in year 2015) and deflated by the Consumer Price Index (hereafter CPI) with 
1997 as base year. The CPI data are obtained from the World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) database of the World Bank.
The tariff data is the effectively applied tariff rate and is drawn from the UNC-
TAD TRAINS database at the HS 6-digit product level. This is for the years 1997, 
2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015. If the tariff data for these years are missing 
in the database, data from previous years are adopted.
We use import demand elasticities at the 6-digit HS level for 117 countries esti-
mated by Kee et al. (2008). These import demand elasticities correspond to the ini-
tial years of our sample and thus are assumed to be constant for the sample period.
The source for the NTM data is also UNCTAD’s TRAINS. There is a newly con-
structed database for NTMs using a new classification, the UNCTAD-MAST clas-
sification for NTMs. The new database is consistently updated at detailed 6-digit 
HS product level and runs over several years. Out of the 150 types of NTM meas-
ures, the measures considered as core NTMs are: Price control measures (TRAINS 
M3 code F1-F3), Quantity Restrictions (TRAINS M3 code A1, B1, E1-E3, G33), 
Monopolistic measures (TRAINS M3 code H) and technical measures (TRAINS 
M3 code A, B, C).8 The core NTM variable takes the value of 1 if any of the above 
measures are in place for a 6-digit tariff line level, and 0 otherwise.
The domestic support data is obtained from WTO members’ notifications 
between 1995 and 2009 at the product level. Similar to the trade flow data, the 
domestic support data is averaged for each three-year span at the product level and 
measured in 1000 dollars. If there is no information on domestic support for a prod-
uct, the data is treated as zero.9 There are altogether 113 products at 6-digit HS tariff 
line with domestic support data reported by WTO members.
The country characteristics data mainly comes from the WDI database for 
1996–2015. Variables measured in nominal terms, namely GDP and capital flows, 
are deflated by the GDP deflator.
9 This is a safe assumption as the database only covers domestic support if in effect and thus reported to 
WTO. This strategy is also applied in Kee et al. (2009) and Hoekman et al. (2004).
8 For the selection of core NTMs, this paper combines information from: (1) the core NTM definition 
in the Kee et al. (2009) paper and the corresponding code in M3 nomenclature; (2) The statistical char-
acteristics of the NTMs data, that is, measures take up altogether over 85% of the overall NTMs; (3) the 
information the author was able to get from contacting UNCTAD directly.
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3.2  Summary descriptives on NTMs
We first summarize information on the incidence of NTMs from the new UNCTAD-
MAST database. There are over 16 categories of different NTMs, among which this 
section focuses on the most influential ones, namely price control measures, quantity 
control measures, technical measures and monopolistic measures.
Following Nicita and Gourdon (2013), we measure frequency using the following 
index:
where F
ct
 is the frequency index in country c at time t and M
nct
 is the dummy for the 
existence of non-zero import for product n in country c at time t. D
nct
 is the dummy 
for core NTMs meaning the existence of core NTMs for product n in country c at 
time t. The frequency index summarizes the percentage of products affected by at 
least one type of core NTMs. Measured frequency lies between 0 and 1, with higher 
values indicating a higher frequency of core NTMs.
Alternatively, we summarize the use of NTMs using the following coverage 
ratio:
where V
nct
 is the import volume of product n in country c at time t and the other vari-
ables are the same as before. The coverage ratio measures the share of imports sub-
ject to core NTMs, with a higher value indicating greater coverage by core NTMs.
Figure 1 reports frequency indices and coverage ratios for the four types of core 
NTMs for our sampled countries and specified years over the period of 1997–2015. 
It shows that there was an overall increase in the frequency and coverage of each 
type of NTMs, indicating an increasing proportion of products and imports that 
were subject to technical measures, quantity restrictions, price controls and monopo-
listic measures. In each year, technical measures (i.e. measure 4 in the graph) have 
the highest frequency index and coverage ratio, compared with other measures, 
indicating that technical measures are the most widespread used measures and with 
their importance growing over time. Following technical measures, the ranking of 
the other measures in terms of importance is: quantity control measures (measure 2 
in the graph), price control measures (measure 1) and lastly monopolistic measures 
(measure 3). These three types of NTMs also affect a broader range of products over 
the period from 1997 to 2015.
As shown in Table 1, quantity control and technical measures are largely applied 
in high-income OECD countries. The incidence for the two measures rose from 
1997 (the frequency index is 0.05 and 0.27 respectively) to 2015 (the frequency 
index is 0.52 and 0.69). The incidence of these measures significantly increased after 
(5)Fct =
�∑
D
nct
M
nct∑
M
nct
�
,
(6)Cct =
�∑
D
nct
V
nct∑
V
nct
�
,
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2009, suggesting that many OECD countries turned to more protective trade policies 
after the financial crisis. The high-income non-OECD countries also showed a simi-
lar trend. Compared with other income groups, the high-income countries are more 
likely to apply technical measures.
For upper middle-income countries, technical measures are the most impor-
tant and most used form of NTM, followed by quantity control measures and price 
control measures. Price control measures are more influential than in high-income 
countries. The incidence of the four types of core NTMs generally increased from 
1997 to 2012, and slightly declined in 2015.
In lower middle-income countries, technical measures are the most important 
NTMs and the coverage was increasing over time to nearly half of the imported 
products in 2015. The incidence of quantity control measures continued to decrease, 
while price control measures became less frequently applied. For low-income coun-
tries, the incidence of core NTMs, namely price control measures, quantity control 
measures or technical measures also increased over time.
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Fig. 1  Incidence of different types of NTM over time (1997–2015)
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Non‑tariff and overall protection: evidence across countries…
Table 2 reports the coverage of different types of NTMs for different sectors and 
industries for our sample of countries over the whole period. Sectors are divided 
according to the HS code at the 2-digit level. Generally, the frequency or incidence 
of core NTMs was greater for agricultural products than for manufacturing goods. 
Whether the estimated AVEs of NTM for agricultural products are higher on aver-
age than for manufacturing products depends on the extent to which imports are 
restricted by NTMs in the two sectors.
The use of different types of NTM varies across industries. For agricultural 
products, technical measures are the most frequently applied. This is consistent 
with expectations, as some technical measures such as sanitary and phytosanitary 
Table 2  Frequency index of different NTM types across economic sectors (1997–2015)
The numbers in brackets in column 1 are the coding for products at 2-digit level in HS1988/92 classifica-
tion. Numbers in Column 2–5 are frequency indices calculated based on Eq. 5. The subscription j in the 
equation refers to sector j in this calculation. Therefore, the number measures the probability of the sec-
tor affected by certain type of NTM. It should also lie between 0 and 1 and the higher it is, the larger the 
proportion of products in this sector that are affected by NTMs
Industry name Price control Quantity control Monopo-
listic 
measures
Technical 
measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agricultural product (HS0 industry 1–24)
 Live animals (1–5) 0.06 0.51 0 0.6
 Vegetable products (6–14) 0.06 0.5 0.01 0.61
 Fats and oils (15) 0.08 0.38 0.01 0.54
 Prepared foodstuffs (16–24) 0.06 0.41 0.01 0.59
 Agricultural mean 0.07 0.45 0.0075 0.59
Manufacturing product (HS0 industry 25–97)
 Mineral products (25–27) 0.04 0.2 0.02 0.24
 Chemical products (28–38) 0.05 0.32 0.01 0.38
 Rubber and plastics (39–40) 0.05 0.18 0.01 0.31
 Raw hide and skins (41–43) 0.04 0.27 0 0.37
 Wood (44–46) 0.06 0.25 0 0.37
 Paper (47–49) 0.05 0.12 0 0.23
 Textile (50–63) 0.05 0.18 0.01 0.37
 Footwear (64–67) 0.04 0.21 0 0.36
 Stone and cement (68–70) 0.05 0.16 0 0.29
 Base metals (71–83) 0.05 0.2 0 0.31
 Machinery and electrical equipment 
(84–85)
0.04 0.25 0.01 0.39
 Motor vehicles (86–89) 0.04 0.27 0.02 0.41
 Optical and medical instruments (90–92) 0.05 0.25 0.01 0.34
 Miscellaneous goods (93–97) 0.05 0.18 0 0.29
Manufacturing mean 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.33
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measures are targeted in particular at agricultural products. About 60% of the agri-
cultural products were affected by technical measures, while quantity control meas-
ures covered 45% of the products. Price control measures such as antidumping 
measures and countervailing measures affected 7% of the agricultural products.
The distribution differs substantially for manufacturing products. For some 
industries, the incidence of NTMs was quite intensive, such as Chemical prod-
ucts (industry 28–38), Machinery and Electrical equipment (industry 84–85), 
Motor vehicles (industry 86–89), technical measures cover about 40% of the 
import of these products and quantity control measures influence about 30% of 
these products. Some industries such as paper (industry 47–49) are less likely to 
be affected by NTMs in general. Less than 25% of products in these industries 
are affected by technical measures, price control measures and quantity control 
measures.
4  Estimation results
4.1  AVE of NTMs and overall protection
We run 5009 regressions based on specification (3), for each HS 6-digit product 
level, to estimate the tariff equivalent of core NTMs for 5009 imported products of 
97 countries (28 EU countries are estimated separately), for each of the six points 
in time over the period 1997–2015. The average  R2s of these regressions was 0.46, 
with a median of 0.43 and maximum of 0.99. Less than 1% of the adjusted  R2s had a 
negative sign. Therefore, the fit of these regressions was generally satisfactory. The 
detailed product level estimates for all countries and years is available on the Links 
(data links) section of the GEP research centre website at: https ://www.notti ngham 
.ac.uk/gep/links /index .aspx. Here we seek to summarize the findings.
Table 3  Average AVE estimates, tariffs and overall protection
Standard errors in parentheses
Year Observa-
tions
Country Simple average Import-weighted average
AVE Tariff Overall AVE Tariff Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1997 128,459 37 0.20 (0.60) 0.12 (0.26) 0.32 (0.66) 0.22 (0.10) 0.10 (0.05) 0.31 (0.11)
2000 150,905 46 0.38 (0.77) 0.12 (0.14) 0.50 (0.79) 0.29 (0.12) 0.10 (0.07) 0.38 (0.13)
2003 317,949 83 0.27 (0.64) 0.08 (0.21) 0.35 (0.68) 0.32 (0.26) 0.11 (0.10) 0.43 (0.26)
2006 338,830 88 0.22 (0.64) 0.06 (0.15) 0.28 (0.66) 0.25 (0.21) 0.10 (0.10) 0.34 (0.20)
2009 342,824 92 0.52 (0.85) 0.05 (0.15) 0.57 (0.87) 0.51 (0.24) 0.08 (0.08) 0.58 (0.23)
2012 346,694 95 0.33 (0.71) 0.05 (0.14) 0.38 (0.73) 0.34 (0.20) 0.04 (0.03) 0.38 (0.21)
2015 332,616 92 0.57 (0.95) 0.05 (0.14) 0.62 (0.96) 0.51 (0.24) 0.04 (0.03) 0.54 (0.25)
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First, we estimate the AVEs of NTMs, using Eq. (4), across different dimensions. 
This enables us to compare the AVEs of NTMs with tariffs and overall protection, to 
assess the evolution of these measures over time.
Table 3 summarizes the average estimated AVEs of NTMs and provides a com-
parison with the corresponding average tariff and overall protection levels for prod-
ucts and countries over our sample period. A comparison of columns 4–5 identifies 
that the average AVE of NTMs is markedly higher than the average tariff throughout 
the period. Tariff rates are broadly decreasing over time, with the unweighted aver-
age tariff rate falling from 12% in 1997 to 5% in 2015. By contrast, the average AVE 
of NTM protection was 20% in 1997, and rose (with some fluctuation over time) to 
57% in 2015. Therefore, NTMs were already a more important source of protection 
than tariffs at the start of our sample period, and have become even more important 
sources of trade protection over this period. When weighted by the import volume 
(columns 7–8), the relative magnitudes of the AVEs and tariff vary slightly, but the 
conclusion about the relative importance of NTMs and tariffs in overall protection is 
unaltered. We can conclude from Table 3 that on average the trade barrier effect due 
to NTMs was much greater than that induced by tariffs. This echoes the finding of 
Kee et al. (2009) on the dominance of NTMs relative to tariffs, but we further show 
that this dominance has increased over time.
A similar conclusion about the relative importance of the two trade policy tools 
can be drawn from an inspection of tariffs and the AVE of NTMs at the product 
level. Appendix Table 6 summarizes the percentage of product lines for each year 
and the full sample of countries where the tariff is greater, smaller or equal to the 
AVE of the core NTMs. At the start of the period, i.e. 1997, the tariff was higher 
than the AVE in just under 44% of product lines. By the end of our sample period 
(i.e., 2015), this was true for only about 27% of products, as compared to nearly two-
thirds of products being subject to higher non-tariff than tariff protection.
Appendix Table  5 sets out the average AVE of NTMs for each country, pre-
sented in coefficient form, for the years for which information was available. Over 
the period from 1997 to 2015, the average AVE of NTMs for most countries was 
increasing in general, though there was variation across countries. Some high 
income countries such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand are identified as con-
sistently ‘low protection’ countries. Countries with the highest AVEs of NTM are 
Morocco, Burkina Faso, Argentina, China, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. All of these 
are low-income countries. However, there was an increase in average AVEs towards 
the end of the sample period for a significant number of both low and high income 
countries. This appears to correspond with the post-financial crisis and the downturn 
in world trade.
4.2  NTMs across sectors
Table 4 reports the distribution of the AVEs of NTMs for different sectors. The AVEs 
are generally higher for agricultural products than for manufacturing products. There 
was an increase in the AVEs for most sectors over the period from 1997 to 2009, 
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though the increase is most evident in manufacturing. Protection from NTMs is 
shown to be consistently high within the agricultural sector, but to be much more var-
iable across industries in the manufacturing sector. By the end of the period, textiles, 
footwear, rubber and plastics, optical and medical instruments, machinery and elec-
trical equipment are the most NTM-protected products in the manufacturing sector.
The comparability of the summary evidence in Table 4 with the evidence from 
other studies is constrained by a number of factors. Many other studies do not 
provide evidence over time or they use alternative classifications for identify-
ing the incidence of NTMs or they adopt different metrics to measure the overall 
extent of NTM barriers or protection. One of the important sources of yearly, 
summary information over the last decade on policy interventions affecting inter-
national trade and other forms of international commercial exchange is the Global 
Table 4  Average AVEs of NTMs for Product Groups
(1) Expressed in coefficient form for a balanced sample of countries, 1997–2015. (2) To rule out the 
possible difference caused by different sample size, this summary only considers country-products with 
available NTM data for the whole period. Products in some country with missing AVEs of NTMs for 
some of the 7 panels are not considered. Therefore, there are same number of available AVEs of NTMs 
for each panel year; (3). Sectors are divided using the same criterion as in Table 2; (4). All of the num-
bers are approximated to two decimal places
Industry Industry name Simple average AVEs of NTMs in each year
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
1–5 Live animals; animal 
products
0.53 0.85 0.50 0.37 0.55 0.51 0.43
6–14 Vegetable products 0.43 0.66 0.59 0.63 0.79 0.40 0.55
15 Fats and oils 0.46 0.52 0.65 0.45 0.92 0.36 0.46
16–24 Prepared foodstuffs 0.48 0.84 0.84 0.78 1.14 0.48 0.75
Agricultural product (1–24) 0.48 0.72 0.65 0.56 0.85 0.44 0.55
25–27 Mineral products 0.20 0.24 0.36 0.29 0.43 0.37 0.51
28–38 Chemical products 0.20 0.35 0.43 0.38 0.70 0.31 0.45
40 Rubber and plastics 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.31 0.25 0.68
41–43 Raw hide and skins 0.17 0.55 0.37 0.42 0.35 0.31 0.47
44–46 Wood 0.32 0.39 0.28 0.33 0.21 0.26 0.37
47–49 Paper 0.12 0.25 0.17 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.56
50–63 Textile 0.17 0.40 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.42 0.61
64–67 Footwear 0.15 0.37 0.39 0.59 0.75 0.58 0.60
68–70 Stone and cement 0.12 0.25 0.33 0.22 0.31 0.27 0.39
72–83 Base metals 0.14 0.30 0.39 0.28 0.40 0.35 0.47
84–85 Machinery and electrical 
equipment
0.15 0.37 0.46 0.21 0.50 0.34 0.61
86–89 Motor vehicles 0.26 0.42 0.44 0.61 0.53 0.51 0.53
90–92 Optical and medical 
instruments
0.27 0.47 0.41 0.53 0.56 0.46 0.74
94–96 Miscellaneous goods 0.18 0.47 0.45 0.50 0.63 0.51 0.54
Manufacturing product (25–96) 0.19 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.45 0.37 0.54
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Dynamics (GD) database of the Global Trade Alert.10 This data (for a larger num-
ber of countries than this study) includes count information on the total number 
of import-related interventions (harmful and liberalizing) implemented each year 
since 2008 to-date. The interventions include tariffs and the coverage of NTMs 
is not the same as that used in this study. For the years that are common with 
the present study, however, there is consistency in the pattern of change in trade 
protection over time between the evidence in Table 4 and the Global Trade Alert 
indicators. If one restricts the GD information to interventions reported within-
year (i.e. up to the end of December in each year), both the overall average AVE 
in Table 4 (for both agriculture and manufacturing) and the count of new harmful 
interventions (reported in brackets for each year in what follows) fall between 
2009 (274) and 2012 (220) and rise between 2012 (220) and 2015 (648).11
4.3  NTMs across countries
The evolution of AVEs of NTMs, tariffs and overall protection can also be explored 
with the present results across countries, and in different regions and different 
income groups, as shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2  Evolution of tariffs, AVE of NTMs and overall protection by region (1997–2015)
11 As in our results, a monotonic upward rise in new interventions/protection is not evident overall in the 
Global Dynamics data for the whole period up to 2018. There is an upward trend in new interventions up 
to 2015 and falls in 2016 and 2017 whether or not using data adjusted for reporting lags.
10 http://www.globa ltrad ealer t.org/globa l_dynam ics.
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A consistent picture is evident across all the regions; namely one of stable lev-
els or modest declines in average tariff levels, combined with much higher lev-
els of overall protection resulting from much higher levels of NTM than tariff 
protection. Indeed, the evolution of overall protection in all regions is predomi-
nantly driven by changes in NTM protection. Except for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
overall protection is higher in all regions by the end of the period than at the 
beginning, and substantially so in the case of some regions (e.g. North America 
and South Asia). Indeed, in the case of North America, the AVEs of NTMs and 
overall trade protection rose consistently after 2003. In most regions, other than 
North America (for which the data starts in 2003), the AVEs of NTMs tended to 
increase before 2003. The clear exception to this is Europe and Central Asia for 
which a sharp fall in NTM protection is identified between 2000 and 2003. This 
may be due to the ending of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA), and the elimina-
tion of the quantity restrictions on textiles imports from developing countries by 
the developed countries. However, after 2006, NTM protection and overall trade 
protection rose again sharply across all regions. The estimates seem to be captur-
ing the effects of the more protectionist trade policies adopted globally following 
the 2008 financial crisis. By 2012, we identify some reversal in this more protec-
tionist stance, though NTM and overall protection generally increased again after 
2012.
Figure  3 depicts the evolution of tariffs, AVEs of NTMs and overall protec-
tion using a classification of countries based on income groupings. The average 
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Fig. 3  Evolution of tariffs, AVE of NTMs and overall protection by income group (1997–2015)
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tariff for high income countries is significantly lower than in the case of mid-
dle and low income countries, but the difference in overall protection between 
higher and lower income countries declined markedly over the period as pro-
tection from NTMs rose more sharply in high income countries (especially the 
OECD countries and after 2006). Average levels of overall protection in 2015 are 
identified by this study to be at a tariff-equivalent of about 60% in both OECD 
and low income countries. Having changed relatively little over the period in the 
low income countries but risen sharply, from a little over 20% at the start of the 
period, in the case of the OECD countries. Clearly the evolution of tariffs fails 
completely to reflect the changing stance of trade policy in this period.
4.4  Comparison with Kee et al. (2009) results
Appendix Table 7 provides the average AVEs estimates for a comparable set of 
countries covered by Kee et al. (2009) in their study (i.e., re-estimated here) and 
this present study, for estimation surrounding 2002 in the former and 2003 in the 
latter. There are some similarities between the two sets of results. The relative 
importance of NTMs and tariffs as sources of protection is a feature of both stud-
ies; non-tariff being more dominant than tariff protection. This is evident from 
the average AVEs and tariff levels in both studies. More than half of the product 
lines subject to core NTMs are identified as being more restricted by NTMs than 
tariffs in both studies. In addition, the most protected industries (or imports com-
peting with products produced by these industries subject to most restriction) are 
identified to be similar in both studies. It is also the case that the individual coun-
tries with the highest level of NTM protection are identified by both studies to be 
generally low-income countries.
However, there are also some differences in the average levels of NTM protec-
tion across countries in the two studies, despite the common estimation method. 
It is evident from Table 7 that average AVEs are generally higher for the com-
parable sample than the present study; only for 24 countries is the average AVE 
higher in the present study, while it is lower in the case of 54 countries. The sim-
ple average AVE across the common set of 82 countries is 29.5% in the current 
study and 42.7% for Kee et al. (2009). These differences are likely to stem from 
the different datasets on NTM incidence adopted, and the comparison is based 
on simple averages. Notwithstanding this, both studies reveal the dominance of 
NTMs relative to tariffs and the importance of non-tariff barriers in determining 
overall protection levels.
4.5  Robustness Analysis
Our base modelling recognizes the possible endogeneity of NTMs. Nonetheless, 
as a further check, we re-estimated the regressions using the 3-year lags of NTMs 
and tariffs. The NTM incidence variable continues to be instrumented (now with 
3-year lagged instruments). Appendix Tables 8 and 9, and R-squares plot depicted 
by Appendix  Fig.  4, report these additional findings. While the magnitude of the 
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average effect differs from the original results (expected given differences across 
observations), the key point is the non-negligible importance of AVE of NTMs still 
holds. Looking at the correlation between original and new estimates (see column 
3 in Table 8), of the more than 5000+ coefficients estimated, we find a correlation 
ranging from 0.36 and 0.75. Furthermore, the R-squares for new estimates mirror 
those of the original estimates. Table 9 shows the correlations between the incidence 
of NTMs over time. The high correlation over time indicates persistence in the inci-
dence and non-incidence of NTMs, with the correlation in incidence between any 
two ‘adjacent’ points in time being at least over 0.7 and generally over 0.8. This 
indicates a ‘slow changing NTM variable’, where cross-sectional, rather than time, 
variation tends to drive our results and in turn implying that our instrumented con-
temporaneous variable is robust.
Next, we re-run the analysis for a balanced sample. Appendix  Table  10 and 
the R-squares in Appendix  Fig.  5 report the results in summary for this sample. 
Although the R-squared graph suggests a slightly lower fit for some regressions, the 
average effect doesn’t differ as much and the correlation between the matched coef-
ficients for the balanced and unbalanced samples is generally high.
Finally, we obtain the AVE of NTMs from estimating the linear specification (2), 
rather than the non-linear specification (3). Given the difference in specifications 
and the susceptibility of the means to be affected by extreme values, the R-squares 
and average AVE of NTMs for the linear and non-linear estimation are not strictly 
comparable. Therefore, we follow Kee et al. (2009) to find the proportion of esti-
mates AVE of NTMs from the linear specification that are negative (i.e. have a trade 
promoting effect). We find around 12–18% of the sample to be so. This is similar 
to Kee et al. who find 13% of AVE of NTMs to be negative. Even though specific 
NTMs, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures or technical measures, could 
have positive trade effects under some circumstances, we do not expect the incidence 
of all core NTMs at the tariff line level to be net trade-promoting for other than a 
very small proportion of tariff lines. Indeed, even in the case of the unrestricted esti-
mation, the overwhelming majority of NTMs are trade-restricting according to our 
estimates. In line with Kee et al. (2009), our preferred estimates for comprehensive 
measurement of the trade effects of non-tariff barriers are those based on a non-
linear estimation method.12
5  Conclusion
This paper sets out to measure the tariff equivalents of NTMs at specific points in time 
over the period 1997–2015. Unlike previous studies, these measures are grounded in 
trade theory and allow for direct comparison with tariffs. This is achieved by apply-
ing a consistent data set and estimation method to derive AVEs over time, using the 
method proposed by Kee et al. (2009). This enables us to explore the evolution of 
NTMs over time, which is left unaddressed by this earlier study. In particular, we 
12 Of course, when modelling the trade effects of specific NTMs for specific commodities one may need 
to give greater weight to evidence from unrestricted estimation methods.
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address the questions of how the AVEs of NTMs and the overall trade protection 
level changed during this period, especially in light of the gradual tariff reductions 
over the recent decades; including the recent 2008 financial crisis. This is achieved by 
adopting a newly assembled database for NTMs, namely UNCTAD-MAST, using a 
consistent classification of NTMs and consistent estimation method.
A descriptive analysis of the NTMs from this data indicates that the overall inci-
dence of the core NTMs, namely price controls, quantity restrictions, monopolistic 
measures and technical measures increased over the period from 1997 to 2015. The 
most widely applied NTMs each year were technical measures, followed by quantity 
restrictions, price control and monopolistic measures.
The regression analysis derived estimates of AVEs of NTMs. They are compared 
to tariff measures and also used to construct measures of overall trade protection. 
NTMs are revealed to be the more dominant trade barrier, with their importance 
growing over the sample period. Thus, overall trade protection is in fact on the rise, 
despite the apparent, gradual trade liberalization associated with tariff reductions. 
Further, NTM and overall protection peaked in 2009, in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis. This is suggestive of a rise in protectionist tendencies after the 2008 
financial crisis, contrary to earlier findings of no pervasive increase in protectionism 
(Kee et al. 2013).
The AVEs of NTMs vary significantly across countries and industries. The evo-
lution of overall protection in all regions of the world is predominantly driven by 
changes in NTM protection, while tariff levels are stable or modestly falling over 
time. This is also reflected when countries are grouped along income lines. Though 
these non-tariff protectionist measures have fluctuated over time both for regional 
and income groupings, there has been a tendency towards an increase in recent 
years. The level of AVEs of NTMs on manufacturing products is generally lower 
than on agricultural products, but there is an evident increase over time in NTM bar-
riers in manufacturing trade.
Given the findings of this study on the growing dominance of non-tariff over tar-
iff sources of protection, even greater attention needs to be given to NTMs by trade 
negotiators, policy makers, and multilateral agencies such as the WTO, World Bank 
and IMF.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and 
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
See Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and Figs. 4, 5.
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Table 5  Average AVEs of NTMs for each country and year
Country ISO3 Year
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Afghanistan AFG 0.61 0.68 0.57
Argentina ARG 0.47 0.53 0.29 0.40 0.63 0.64 0.77
Australia AUS 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Austria AUT 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.24 0.64
Belgium BEL 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.23 0.63
Benin BEN 0.66 0.84
Burkina Faso BFA 0.61 0.85 0.60 0.78 0.56 0.82
Bulgaria BGR 0.61 0.33 0.70
Bolivia BOL 0.37 0.63 0.45 0.56 0.77 0.66 0.79
Brazil BRA 0.39 0.44 0.30 0.41 0.59 0.68 0.76
Brunei Darussalam BRN 0.07 0.51 0.61 0.42 0.29 0.66
Canada CAN 0.35 0.39 0.59 0.39 0.72
Chile CHL 0.31 0.58 0.44 0.36 0.59 0.35 0.76
China CHN 0.38 0.62 0.71 0.46 0.64 0.61 0.75
Cote d’Ivoire CIV 0.61 0.66 0.41 0.64 0.87 0.11 0.09
Colombia COL 0.14 0.20 0.28 0.32 0.46 0.39 0.59
Cabo Verde CPV 0.00 0.71 0.23 0.00
Costa Rica CRI 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.28 0.12 0.22
Cuba CUB 0.74 0.46 0.65
Cyprus CYP 0.73 0.45 0.70 0.34 0.72
Czech Republic CZE 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.26 0.65
Germany DEU 0.02 0.02 0.54 0.34 0.67
Denmark DNK 0.02 0.02 0.59 0.27 0.66
Dominican Republic DOM 0.00 0.00
Ecuador ECU 0.15 0.23 0.42 0.37 0.62 0.45 0.68
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY 0.05 0.54 0.62 0.53 0.69 0.58 0.71
Spain ESP 0.60 0.44 0.62 0.38 0.70
Estonia EST 0.01 0.02 0.58 0.24 0.64
Finland FIN 0.02 0.03 0.59 0.25 0.70
France FRA 0.02 0.02 0.54 0.32 0.67
United Kingdom GBR 0.02 0.02 0.56 0.41 0.67
Ghana GHA 0.08 0.28 0.19 0.28 0.17 0.78
Guinea GIN 0.64 0.95
Gambia, The GMB 0.63 0.76 0.16 0.17
Greece GRC 0.02 0.03 0.58 0.43 0.70
Guatemala GTM 0.10 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.29 0.17 0.21
Hong Kong SAR China HKG 0.43 0.59 0.67 0.38 0.63 0.24 0.69
Honduras HND 0.08 0.17 0.30 0.16 0.27 0.13 0.19
Croatia HRV 0.29 0.67
Hungary HUN 0.02 0.02 0.56 0.32 0.65
Indonesia IDN 0.06 0.44 0.58 0.43 0.58 0.39 0.65
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Table 5  (continued)
Country ISO3 Year
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
India IND 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.66 0.74
Ireland IRL 0.02 0.02 0.58 0.33 0.66
Israel ISR 0.52 0.42 0.68 0.30 0.68
Italy ITA 0.07 0.10 0.55 0.37 0.67
Jamaica JAM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan JPN 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05
Kazakhstan KAZ 0.15 0.23 0.29 0.34
Cambodia KHM 0.49 0.32 0.94 0.80 0.96
Korea, Rep. KOR 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Lebanon LBN 0.00 0.74 0.64 0.46 0.68 0.21 0.70
Sri Lanka LKA 0.65 0.77 0.47 0.66 0.32 0.74
Lithuania LTU 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.32 0.69
Luxembourg LUX 0.02 0.02 0.66 0.23 0.70
Latvia LVA 0.02 0.02 0.62 0.26 0.69
Morocco MAR 0.39 0.76 0.80 0.50 0.72 0.36 0.72
Madagascar MDG 0.33 0.43 0.35 0.46 0.43 0.25
Mexico MEX 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.27 0.43 0.35 0.46
Mali MLI 0.51 0.02 0.80 0.63 0.79 0.87
Malta MLT 0.11 0.12 0.66 0.31 0.00
Mauritius MUS 0.15 0.37 0.48 0.27 0.46 0.15 0.21
Malawi MWI 0.29 0.20 0.34 0.22 0.33 0.19 0.23
Malaysia MYS 0.10 0.54 0.51 0.38 0.59 0.33 0.66
Niger NER 0.65 0.66 0.80 0.62 0.82
Nigeria NGA 0.57 0.77 0.88 0.80
Nicaragua NIC 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.15 0.28 0.14 0.18
Netherlands NLD 0.02 0.02 0.54 0.27 0.64
Nepal NPL 0.56 0.85 0.73 0.49 0.77
New Zealand NZL 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Pakistan PAK 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.59 0.55
Panama PAN 0.09 0.16 0.30 0.28 0.43 0.26 0.00
Peru PER 0.16 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.55 0.39 0.70
Philippines PHL 0.42 0.52 0.67 0.54 0.70 0.65 0.76
Poland POL 0.02 0.02 0.56 0.35 0.66
Portugal PRT 0.54 0.41 0.62 0.36 0.67
Paraguay PRY 0.31 0.62 0.55 0.51 0.75 0.70 0.78
Romania ROM 0.59 0.33 0.70
Russian Federation RUS 0.03 0.61 0.50 0.70
Rwanda RWA 0.31 0.21 0.39 0.33 0.47 0.24 0.35
Senegal SEN 0.61 0.80 0.55 0.75 0.50 0.81
Singapore SGP 0.06 0.61 0.70 0.44 0.65 0.25 0.69
El Salvador SLV 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.27 0.16 0.20
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Table 5  (continued)
Country ISO3 Year
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Slovak Republic SVK 0.02 0.57 0.27 0.66
Slovenia SVN 0.02 0.02 0.60 0.26 0.66
Sweden SWE 0.02 0.02 0.57 0.25 0.65
Togo TGO 0.38 0.55 0.74 0.60 0.80 0.11 0.12
Thailand THA 0.19 0.29 0.21 0.62 0.41 0.73
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tunisia TUN 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.60 0.36 0.72
Turkey TUR 0.08 0.66 0.39 0.43 0.63 0.47 0.73
Tanzania TZA 0.49 0.38 0.37
Ukraine UKR 0.01 0.03 0.63 0.47 0.71
Uruguay URY 0.40 0.60 0.45 0.46 0.69 0.39 0.82
United States USA 0.27 0.37 0.57 0.61 0.74
Venezuela, RB VEN 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.28
Vietnam VNM 0.51 0.71 0.58 0.78
South Africa ZAF 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Table 6  Percentage of product 
lines with tariff rate greater, 
equal to and smaller than AVE 
of NTMs for products subject to 
core NTM, by year
Year Tariff > NTM (%) Tariff = NTM 
(%)
Tariff < NTM (%)
1997 43.87 4.65 51.48
2000 26.81 3.16 70.03
2003 20.72 2.06 77.22
2006 35.27 6.58 58.15
2009 17.86 1.69 80.45
2012 28.15 5.17 66.68
2015 27.27 6.31 66.41
Table 7  Comparison with 
estimates of Kee et al. (2009) ISO3 Year Observations Simple average of AVEs of NTM
Our estimates Kee et al. 
estimates
ARG 2003 4131 0.34 0.53
AUS 2003 4630 0.47 0.55
AUT 2003 4755 0.28 0.65
BFA 2003 1313 0.88 0.54
BOL 2003 2796 0.59 0.55
BRA 2003 4378 0.31 0.58
BRN 2003 3869 0.40 0.58
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Table 7  (continued) ISO3 Year Observations Simple average of AVEs of 
NTM
Our estimates Kee et al. 
estimates
CAN 2003 4774 0.27 0.47
CHL 2003 3934 0.44 0.43
CHN 2003 4617 0.56 0.47
CIV 2003 2317 0.34 0.59
COL 2003 4126 0.44 0.47
CRI 2003 3488 0.58 0.48
CZE 2003 4651 1.11 0.29
DEU 2003 4809 0.35 0.59
DNK 2003 4725 0.26 0.63
EGY 2003 3646 0.50 0.55
ESP 2003 4805 0.38 0.58
FIN 2003 4650 0.32 0.61
FRA 2003 4807 0.28 0.65
GBR 2003 4798 0.34 0.56
GHA 2003 2617 0.74 0.50
GRC 2003 4711 0.29 0.70
GTM 2003 3951 0.53 0.51
HKG 2003 4893 0.53 0.43
HND 2003 3374 0.89 0.54
HUN 2003 4317 0.48 0.44
IDN 2003 4490 0.51 0.59
IND 2003 4039 0.55 0.51
IRL 2003 4670 0.24 0.71
ITA 2003 4807 0.26 0.61
JPN 2003 4791 0.16 0.51
KOR 2003 4627 0.78 0.21
LBN 2003 3801 0.56 0.56
LKA 2003 3494 0.90 0.42
LTU 2003 4469 0.57 0.51
LVA 2003 3727 0.54 0.55
MAR 2003 3696 0.65 0.49
MDG 2003 2475 0.61 0.51
MEX 2003 4570 0.32 0.46
MLI 2003 1217 0.86 0.59
MUS 2003 3542 0.72 0.56
MWI 2003 1951 0.80 0.65
MYS 2003 4835 0.46 0.46
NIC 2003 3502 0.76 0.58
NLD 2003 4793 0.37 0.60
NZL 2003 4531 0.63 0.52
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Table 8  Average AVE of 
NTMs for lagged policy 
variables, by year
Year No. of Coun-
tries
Mean (SD) Correlation with 
original results
(1) (2) (3)
2000 37 0.24 (0.68) 0.36
2003 46 0.34 (0.80) 0.42
2006 81 0.27 (0.71) 0.53
2009 88 0.32 (0.77) 0.41
2012 92 0.65 (0.97) 0.41
2015 92 0.59 (0.95) 0.75
Table 7  (continued) ISO3 Year Observations Simple average of AVEs of 
NTM
Our estimates Kee et al. 
estimates
PER 2003 3603 0.43 0.51
PHL 2003 4086 0.57 0.52
POL 2003 4287 0.26 0.46
PRT 2003 4734 0.37 0.65
PRY 2003 2749 0.58 0.64
RWA 2003 971 1.02 0.76
SEN 2003 2128 0.73 0.61
SGP 2003 4875 0.63 0.51
SLV 2003 4049 0.46 0.59
SVN 2003 4398 0.48 0.53
SWE 2003 4716 0.32 0.57
THA 2003 4349 0.50 0.53
TUN 2003 3712 0.66 0.50
TUR 2003 4476 0.40 0.48
UKR 2003 3958 0.59 0.53
URY 2003 3151 0.44 0.57
USA 2003 4757 0.24 0.52
VEN 2003 4234 0.48 0.47
ZAF 2003 4650 0.45 0.45
This is the comparison of our estimates with Kee et  al. estimation 
among the sample for which both our estimations are non-missing. 
So the sample size here is smaller than our full sample
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Table 9  Correlation matrix of 
incidence of core NTMs 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
1997 1
2000 0.7228 1
2003 0.632 0.8678 1
2006 0.5604 0.7764 0.8968 1
2009 0.5346 0.7355 0.848 0.9427 1
2012 0.4247 0.6046 0.7018 0.7763 0.8217 1
2015 0.4118 0.5552 0.6504 0.7199 0.7628 0.9218 1
Table 10  Results for AVE of NTMs with Balanced Sample of Countries, by Year
Year No. of countries 
with balanced 
sample
Balanced 
Sample Mean 
(SD)
No. of countries 
with original 
sample
Original 
Sample Mean 
(SD)
Correlation of 
estimates between 
samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 76 0.24 (0.61) 83 0.27 (0.64) 0.86
2006 76 0.23 (0.60) 88 0.22 (0.64) 0.55
2009 76 0.49 (0.83) 92 0.52 (0.85) 0.75
2012 76 0.35 (0.73) 95 0.33 (0.71) 0.68
2015 76 0.46 (0.87) 92 0.57 (0.95) 0.70
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Fig. 4  R-squares from the estimated regressions with contemporaneous and lagged policy variables
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